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Bank Branches and Rural Deposits: 
Evidence from Bangladesh 
By 
Richard L. Meyer 
M.A. Baqui Khalily 
Leroy J. Hushak 
Introduction 
Three important reasons exist for the increased attention 
given to rural deposit mobilization in developing countries. 
First, countries must improve aggregate savings rates in order to 
substitute for reduced inflows of foreign savings. By 
definition, the rural sector looms large in these economies so it 
must furnish much of the savings, and some research shows that 
marginal propensities to save are higher in rural than in urban 
areas (e.g., Alamgir: Williamson). Secondly, strong arguments 
have been made recognizing the benefits that rural·households 
obtain from secure places to hold financial assets (Adams; 
Vogel), and showing how the average rate of return to investment 
can rise through increased financial intermediation (Fry). 
Third, several arguments link the viability of rural financial 
institutions to increased deposit mobilization (Meyer). 
A long list of factors are expected to influence deposits in 
rural financial institutions. Wai's framework of ability, 
willingness and opportunity to demand deposits has inspired much 
research. Opportunity is an important factor over which policy-
makers have some control and deserves analysis for two reasons. 
First, research has shown that access to deposit services, 
measured by the density of deposit-taking institutions, is an 
important determinant of rural deposits (e.g., Srinivasan and 
Meyer, 1986). Policymakers have great influence over banking 
density through licensing and other regulations. Second, the 
policy emphasis on increased rural lending has prompted the 
expansion of lending facilities in rural areas. But some 
institutions, such as specialized agricultural development banks, 
are often denied the opportunity to use their branch network to 
accept deposits, while in other cases deposit taking has simply 
not been aggressively pursued because of funds easily available 
from the central bank and/or donors. 
The rural deposit mobilization experience in Bangladesh is 
particularly interesting to evaluate. For several years the 
country employed policies to expand agricultural lending and, 
along with it, the bank branching network into rural areas. The 
impact on rural deposits has been significant because expanding 
the banking network can reduce transaction costs for depositors. 
Smaller size bank deposits become more attractive for households 
when transaction costs fall. On the other hand, full-service 
rural bank branches are expensive to operate even with the labor 
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intensive technology employed in Bangladesh. There are sugges-
tions that the rapid expansion of rural branches has had a 
negative impact on the economics of bank operations (World Bank). 
In addition to the deposit mobilization that occurs, the 
economics of rural banking requires the analysis of lending 
operations. Banks have responded to the country's desire to 
expand rural lending, and the distribution of branches can be 
expected to be influenced by the volume of loans made. By 
providing both loan and deposit services, branches may be able to 
capitalize on economies of scale and scope. Interestingly, when 
two nationalized commercial banks (NCBs) were privatized, they 
dropped out of special agricultural credit programs and 
transferred some of their rural branches to other banks. Perhaps 
they believed it was not profitable to operate rural branches 
solely for deposit mobilization purposes, especially when 
delinquency rates on agricultural loans are high. 
The economics of rural branch operations are evaluated in a 
study by Srinivasan and Meyer (1988). The purpose of this paper 
is to document the deposit mobilization experience and to test 
the relationship between rural deposits and rural bank branches. 
Most research on rural deposits assumes that increased bank 
density stimulates households to deposit by reducing transaction 
costs to make and withdraw deposits. Little attention is paid to 
how deposits affect bank branching. This paper presents the 
results of a model to test the simultaneous relation between bank 
branching and deposits. An increase in branch density stimulates 
deposits while deposit potential also affects the number and 
location of bank branches. 
The next section of this paper contains a brief review of 
the Bangladesh financial system and the policies that have 
influenced deposit mobilization, especially in rural areas. The 
third section reports the evolution of total and rural deposits. 
An econometric analysis of the determinants of rural deposits is 
presented in section four. The last section contains a 
discussion of the implications for rural deposit mobilization. 
Financial Institutions and Policies 
The Bangladesh financial system is still in the early stages 
of development. Following independence from Pakistan, all banks 
and insurance companies, excluding foreign companies, were 
nationalized on March 26, 1972, and six commercial banks and two 
insurance corporations were created. Foreign banks were allowed 
to operate under restricted conditions. At the beginning of 
1981, Bangladesh had sixteen banks including seven foreign banks. 
During the 1983-84 period, eight private banks were licensed 
including two denationalized commercial banks. Most banks 
concentrate their operations in urban areas so rural deposit 
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mobilization is done mostly by the NCBs and the specialized 
agricultural development bank (Bangladesh Krishi Bank - BKB). 
Rural deposits in cooperatives and the postal savings systems are 
insignificant by comparison. 
The nationalization of the banking system was undertaken for 
several economic and political reasons. Gove~nment control over 
the nationalized banks is pervasive, but regulation of the entjre 
banking system is strong. This intervention affects bank 
performance and viability, particularly of rural branchAs. Tha 
Bangladesh Bank (central bank) regulates banking, and formulates 
policies under the strong guidance and direction of the Ministry 
of Finance. Three major policies--interest rate regulation, 
branch licensing and refinancing--directly affect rural deposit 
mobilization. 
Interest rates on both deposits and loans are regulated and 
the deposit rate structure was revised significantly three times 
in 1974, 1976 and 1980 (Table 1). The range of rate increase was 
greatest in 1980 ranging between 2-1/2 and 5-3/4 percentage 
points. In the 1980s, interest rates on some classes of deposits 
in rural bank branches have been one or two percentage points 
higher than those in urban branches. Changes in deposit rate 
structure, however, have not kept pace with inflation. The real 
weighted interest rate paid on interest bearing deposits was 
negative every year from 1976 through 1984 with the exception of 
1976, 19~2 and 1983. 
Rural branching policy appears to have been pursued largely 
with the objective of supplying cheap credit to farmers. 
However, historically two major factors were considered in 
granting licenses for banks to open new bra~ches: deposit 
potential, as a function of income, and degree of competitive-
ness. This policy created insufficient demand for rural licenses 
so a "two-·for-one" policy was introduced during the 1977-78 
financial year whereby a bank was required to open two rural 
branches for each new urban branch authorized. During the period 
1977-81, the number of rural bank branches almost doubled from 
857 to 1,527. The expansion of rural branches slowed follow~ng 
the suspension of this policy in 1981. It is alleged that the 
decision to open rural branches during this expansion period was 
not always based on branch profitability (World Bank), but the 
new branches clearly had a positive influence on rural deposit 
mobilization. 
The availability of cheap rediscount funds for agricultura] 
loans may be an important disincentive for banks to mobilize 
deposits but there is little empirical research that actu~lly 
tests for this negative causality (e.g., Meyer and Esguerra). 
The NCBs and especially BKB have been supplied with relatively 
abundant rediscount funds for their agricultural lending. Prior 
to Septemb~r. 1983, refinancing facilities varied between 30 and 
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100 percent of the amount of targeted rural loans made by the 
.bank and the interest rate charged was six percent, which was two 
perc~~tage points below the bank rate 1 and half the 12 percent 
charged to borrowers. This policy was revised in September, 1983 
at the urging of USAID to reduce bank dependency on refinancing 
and atimulate deposit mobilization. 
The nature of the rural economy presents opportunities and 
challen$es for developing cost-effective rural financial 
services. On the one hand, in a densely populated country like 
Bangladesh 2 , there appears to be good potential fo~ developing a 
dense banking network in rural areas that will bring bank 
branches fairly close to most rural residents. On the other 
hand, the market for deposit services is limited. Incomes are 
low (average per capita income in the country of about $150), 
most farm and nonfarm enterprises operate at a low volume, many 
transactions are not monetized, slow-moving rickshaws are the 
most iMportant source of transportation so travel dist~nces are 
usually short, and travel is particularly difficult in the wet 
s~as~n when much of the land is flooded. Therefore, transaction 
costs for many rural depositors with small accounts are likely to 
be high in spite of whatever internal efficiencies a branch can 
achieve. 
The loan market is also constrained and the delinquency rate 
is hlgh on agricultural loans. Many potential borrowers are not 
credit worthy. Tbey have low and variable incomes, and have few 
reserves for times of adversity. Low-lying areas are subject to 
severe flooding which wipes out the few reserves held by farm 
households. Governmental relief and agricultural i.rograms do not 
alleviate these conditions in any significant way 1or most 
households. In th~se relatively unfavorable circumstances, 
unless th~ banking system is provided with strong incentives, it 
is not likely to make many farm loans. 
patterns and Tre~ds in Bank Deposits 
The patterns and trends in total and rural bank deposits for 
the period 1975-84 are presented in this section. The deposit 
data used in Bangladesh are obtained from quarterly reports 
prepared by each bank branch and submitted directly to the 
Bang~ad~sh Bank for computer processing. Some errors exist in 
th~ computer tapes and the reports produced from them. Some 
branches are late in submitting their reports so the tapes do not 
!rhe bank rate ls the normal rate at which b~nks can borrow 
from the Bangladesl1 Bank for liquidity purposes. 
2100 million l'Pople in an area about the size of the state 
of Wisconsin. 
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include their entries. There are some quality control problems 
in data entry at both the branch and central bank. This results 
in missing branches and unverified and duplicate data records. 
These problems were corrected in the econometric analysis 
reported below, but they undoubtedly exist in the published data 
reported in this section. It is not expected, however, that 
these errors are significant enough to affect the overall 
conclusions. Bank deposits are defined as deposits in all banks 
except cooperative banks. Rural deposits are defined as those 
deposits held in bank branches defined as "rural" by the Bangla-
desh Bank; likewise urban deposits are defined as those held by 
"urban" branches operating in metropolitan and municipal areas. 
Total bank deposits, expressed in nominal terms, experienced 
an average growth rate exceeding 24 percent for the 1975-84 
period (Table 2). By 1984, deposits had increased seven times 
their 1975 level. By comparison, the annual average inflation 
rate was about 11 percent. Interest bearing deposits (special 
accounts, savings and term deposits) increased about ten times, 
while non-interest bearing deposits (current and call deposits) 
increased about five times indicating a considerable response to 
interest rate changes. 
During this period, significant changes also took place in 
the proportion of personal deposits to total deposits. The share 
of personal deposits increased from 29 percent in 1975 to over 45 
percent in 1984, while the share of other deposits (groups, 
organizations, government, businesses, etc.) declined. As shown 
below, rural deposits contributed to this growing share of 
personal deposits. 
Historically most deposits were held by the NCBs because of 
their wide network and their predominance in the total banking 
sector. Their deposit share decreased significantly, however, 
from 90 percent to 71 percent during the 1973-84 period, partly 
due to increased bank privatization. Specialized banks increased 
their share to over 5 percent while the share for foreign and 
private banks rose to over 23 percent. 
Changes in rural and urban bank deposits during the period 
1976-84 are reported in Table 3. Total nominal rural deposits 
grew more than ten fold and the share of rural deposits increased 
from 9.2 to over 17 percent. The effects of the "two-for-one'' 
branching policy can be seen by the relatively rapid expansion of 
rural branches. In 1976 less than one-half of the total branches 
were rural, but by 1984 about two-thirds were rural. Average 
deposits per rural branch almost tripled in this period. 
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To account for inflation, the deposit data were deflated.3 
Real rural deposits grew from 1.1 to 5.2 billion taka (1976=100) 
from 1976 to 1984. From 1976 to 1982 real deposits per branch 
ranged from a high of 1.34 million taka in 1977 to a low of 1.05 
million in 1982, then rose to 1.58 million by 1984. Therefore, 
during much of this entire 1976-82 period the growth in real 
deposits kept pace with the growth in branches. Only in the 
years 1982-84 was there a steady increase in real deposits per 
branch. The pattern for urban deposits was somewhat similar. 
Total nominal deposits grew about six fold but only 2.5 ti•ea in 
real terms from 1976 to 1984. Average real deposits per urban 
branch fluctuated around 11.0 to 11.5 million taka from 1976 to 
1982, then began a rapid rise reaching just over 15 million by 
1984. Since the number of urban branches increased more slowly 
than rural branches, the increase in real deposits per urban 
branch was somewhat greater. This result may imply that urban 
residents already enjoyed fairly good access to banking in the 
mid-1970s so that branch expansion subsequently contributed 
somewhat less to urban deposit growth. 
The other important feature to note is the relative size of 
rural and urban branches. The average amount of deposits per 
rural branch in 1984 was about 3.7 million taka (approxi•ately 
$148,000). 4 Average urban deposits per branch, however, were 
almost 10 times this level. Small branch size can imply high 
costs for rural banking, the subject of a paper by Srinivasan and 
Meyer (1988). 
The published data do not permit a detailed analysis of 
rural deposits. Therefore, the original branch level data 
compiled on the Bangladesh Bank data tapes were used to analyze 
the deposits of the four major NCBs (Agrani, Janata, Rupali, 
Sonali) and BKB. These institutions have most of the rural bank 
branches (84 percent in 1984) and mobilize most of the rural 
deposits (91 percent of 1984 deposits). These data are limited 
to the years 1983 and 1984, however, so they show the patterns of 
deposit growth in two years of rapid expansion as nominal rural 
deposits doubled during these two years. 
The distribution of rural deposits held by these five major 
banks is reported in Table 4. Non-interest bearing deposits 
constituted about 20 percent of total rural deposits, a 
proportion similar to that found in urban branches. Seven out of 
eight interest-bearing deposit categories showed more rapid 
3 rhe consumer's price index published in the International 
Financial Statistics was used in the absence of a complete 
inflation series for rural areas. 
4The exchange rate was roughly 25 taka 
period. 


























growth in this period, however. Furthermore, all categories of 
term deposits increased more rapidly than all other types of 
deposits. Total rural deposits increased by about 45 percent, 
while the increases in term deposits ranged between 57 to 133 
percent. This change in deposit composition suggests that rural 
depositors treat a large portion of deposits as investments, and 
they are responsive to higher interest rates. An analysis of 
deposit growth by specific interest rate intervals showed that 
deposit categories that earned 12 percent or more experienced the 
most rapid growth. 
Rural branches provide services to local businesses and 
governmental units, as well as households. The data in Table 5 
provide an indication of clientele served according to the 
distribution of rural deposits by category of depositors. There 
are some doubts about the accuracy in reporting these specific 
categories but it appears that over 80 percent of the deposits 
originated from the private sector during these two years. 
Personal and service deposits constituted about three-fifths 
while public sector deposits constituted about 16 percent. It 
appears, therefore, that a significant amount of rural bank 
deposits come from households. 
Unfortunately, the characteristics of personal depositors 
are unknown so the amounts actually deposited by farm households 
or by low income groups cannot be identified. Some inferences 
about deposits of low and middle income households can be 
obtained, however, by analyzing the size distribution of 
accounts. These rural branches had about 4 million accounts in 
1983 and almost 5 million in 1984. About 95 percent of these 
accounts were less than 5,000 taka in size representing about 
half the total rural deposits (Table 6) implying that low and 
medium income households make significant use of these financial 
instruments. Furthermore, the growth rate in amount and number 
of small-sized accounts in the two years tended to be greater 
than many of the large size categories. There is no way to 
distinguish, however, the accounts related to farm versus nonfarm 
households. 
The econometric analysis reported in the next section 
analyzed district level data. The distribution of rural deposits 
by district is reported in Table 7. 5 The magnitude and growth in 
deposits varied widely across districts. The three most 
commercially developed districts of Chittagong, Dhaka and Sylhet 
tended to expand deposits somewhat less rapidly than many less 
developed districts. This may imply that banking and moneti-
zation of the economy expanded more quickly in the hinterland in 
5District is an intermediate administrative unit between 
division and Upa-zilla. 
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this period than in regions already more developed. The develop-
ed regions presumably also started with a higher base. 
Determinants of Deposit Behavior 
In the previous section we documented the growth of rural 
bank branches and their deposits. This section reports the 
empirical results of a model designed to explain voluntary rural 
financial savings deposits in the five banks described above. A 
subset of district level interest-bearing deposits was obtained 
for the five banks from the Bangladesh Bank Data Tape. The model 
was specified to capture the behavior of the households that 
demand these deposits. 
Previous studies of demand for rural deposits have used 
single equation models based on the implicit assumption of 
independence of supply of and demand for deposit services. This 
approach fails to recognize, however, that the number and 
distribution of deposit-taking institutions is influenced in part 
by deposit potential. Although the primary objective of banks 
during much of this period may have been to obtain urban branch 
licenses, the decision to seek a license for a rural branch in a 
particular location is determined by the possibility of tapping 
deposit potential, either because no branch exists in that •arket 
area or because the deposit potential is still great relative to 
the number of current branches. The competition among branches 
should expand aggregate deposits. Therefore, a simultaneous 
equation model was developed to explain district deposits and 
bank branches. 
Since the introduction of the McKinnon and Shaw theoretical 
models, researchers have largely concentrated on two variables in 
the analysis of financial development: interest rates and 
banking facilities. Five major factors are found in the 
literature of deposit determination functions---income, interest 
rates, access to banking facilities, transaction costs and yields 
on competing non-financial investments. Some important but 
difficult to measure factors, such as quality of services 
provided to depositors, awareness of banking services and 
perceptions of the safety of deposits, have been largely ignored 
in empirical research. 
Income is expected to have a positive effect on deposits. 
Because of the variability of rural income, the "permanent 
income" hypothesis may better explain the influence of inco•e 
than does the "absolute income" hypothesis. Even though the 
empirical validity of the permanent income hypothesis for savings 
is well established (e.g., Canh; Friend and Taubman: Williamson), 
duta limitations have forced <leposJt mobilization studies to 
utilize absolute income (e.g., Srinivasan and Meyer, 1986; 
Va s q u e z ) . TlH· h y p: d.!H' s i s J s t h a t de po s i t o r s are s en s i t i v e t o 
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changes in transitory income and use financial savings to even 
out consumption expenditures under variable income situations. 
Thus, the elasticity of deposits with respect to transitory 
income is expected to be higher than with respect to permanent 
income. 
The most widely debated issue in rural finance is the 
relationship between interest rates and financial savings. 
McKinnon and Shaw argued that low nominal interest rates 
contribute to inefficient investment decisions and mobilization 
of household savings. Several studies following their views have 
established that low nominal interest rates coupled with high 
inflation rates discourage deposits while positive real interest 
rates stimulate deposits (e.g., Fry; Giovannini; Lanyi and 
Saracoglu; Srinivasan and Meyer, 1986; Vasquez). Wai argued that 
in LDCs, however, financial savings may not be responsive to 
interest rates because market rates are below equilibrium levels, 
depositors may be insensitive to small changes in interest rates, 
income effects outweigh substitution effects, and religious and 
social rules prohibit interest rates. Some studies have in fact 
demonstrated a weak relationship between interest rates and 
deposits (e.g., Iqbal; Tanchoco-Subida). On the other hand, 
Lanyi and Saracoglu, using empirical evidence from Asian and 
Latin American countries, suggested that the substitution effect 
of higher interest rates is more important than the income effect 
in developing countries so positive real interest rates should 
positively influence deposits. 
Burkett and Vogel, and Ortmeyer underscored the significant 
role of transaction costs in portfolio decisions of households. 
The transaction costs of making and withdrawing deposits reduce 
the net returns received by depositors. Most of the literature, 
however, only considers the impact of borrower and lender 
transaction costs on credit rationing (Ahmed; Gonzalez-Vega; 
McKinnon; Shaw), and no study has been found that directly tests 
the effects of depositor transaction costs on deposits. Most 
studies rely on indirect estimates of transaction cost effects. 
Depositor transaction costs can be proxied by number of banking 
facilities, and availability of roads and vehicles. Several 
studies have found a positive and significant relationship 
between demand for deposits and expansion of bank branches (e.g., 
Burkett and Vogel; Rana; Srinivasan and Meyer, 1986; Vasquez; 
Wai). 
Some analysts argue that demand for deposits is influenced 
by education which, among other effects, may increase the 
awareness of rural people about banking services (Mauri; Von 
Pischke) but literacy or awareness are among the least emphasized 
factors in rural deposit studies. The limited available 
empirical evidence is inconclusive; Vasquez found a negative 
elasticity of deposits with respect to education in the Dominican 
Republic while Koropecky found a positive relationship in 
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Bangladesh. But it is expected that as rural people become aore 
knowledgeable about banking and banking services, either because 
of general education or the effect of having a nearby branch, 
they will develop confidence in banking institutions and their 
employees, and a sense of security in bank deposits leading to 
increased demand for deposits. 
The factors that explain rural bank branching are less well 
understood. No study has been located which explicitly accounted 
for the impact of deposits on number and location of deposit-
taking facilities in developing countries. Yet it should be 
expected that decisions to expand such facilities will depend on 
deposit potential, regional income, level of competition, and 
transportation and communications facilities available. The 
supply-leading approach to rural finance suggests that volume of 
rural loans contributes positively to the expansion of banking 
facilities (Patrick; Rana), but no study has been located that 
empirically tests this relationship. When strong incentives are 
given to expand rural loans, the actual or potential volume of 
rural credit may be an important factor affecting branching. 
The limited empirical evidence available on bank branching 
suggests that level of competition and deposit potential in fact 
influence location of bank branches (Doyle et al.; Spong and 
Hoenig). In the Bangladesh case, the central bank appears to 
consider deposit potential and level of competition when 
evaluating requests for licenses to open new branches. Further~ 
more, it is expected that banks consider several factors 
influencing branch viability when requesting specific licenses, 
such as permanent income in a region. actual or potential voluae 
of loans, inflation rates which influence the real level of 
deposits, the availability of transportation, and the volume of 
deposits generated by other banks. 
Income, being an important determinant of deposits, is also 
expected to be a key variable explaining rural branch location. 
The higher the level of permanent income, the greater the deposit 
potential and the greater should be the network of rural banks. 
Doyle et al. used number of retail shops as an indicator of 
deposit potential. Since it appears that one of the policy 
objectives in Bangladesh was to expand rural branches as a way to 
expand rural lending, it is expected that the greater the volume 
of rural loans outstanding, the larger will be the branch 
network. It is expected that inflation will adversely affect 
bank expansion because of its expected negative impact on deaand 
for deposits. On the other hand, i•provements in rural trans-
portation should encourage banks to expand their facilities in 
rural areas because of easier and faster travel, and possibly 
greater safety in handling money and providing banking services. 
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Empirical Model 
Postulating a two-way causality between deposits and bank 
branches implies the need for a simultaneous equations model. 
The mathematical form selected was a power function based on a 
Cobb-Douglas production function. To account for differences in 
district size, a per capita specification of the variables was 
used. As in previous studies, linearity was imposed and the 













+ b 5 ln(DINT/POP) + ~ 2 
District per capita interest bearing deposits; 
District per capita permanent income; 
District per capita transitory income; 
Number of district rural bank branches 
per capita; 
( 1 ) 
( 2 ) 
District per capita index of roads and vehicles; 
District literacy rate; 
District rural inflation; 
District per capita volume of rural loans 
outstanding; 
error terms 
Equation (1) represents the demand for deposits function 
while equation (2) represents the supply of deposit services 
through expansion of bank branches. The conceptual discussion 
above which yields equations (1) and (2) excludes CR from 
equation (1) and L and PVT from equation (2) which satisfies the 
order conditions. 
Two-stage least squares (2SLS) were used to estimate the 
parameters of the structural equations. The F-ratio was used to 
estimate the validity of the model and the conventional t-test 
was used to test the significance levels of the estimated parame-
ters. 
As discussed above, the relationship between deposits and 
number of bank branches is expected to be positive. Except for 
inflation, all other variables--permanent income, transitory 
income, literacy, and roads and vehicles--are likely to have 
positive signs in the deposit equation. Similarly, the number of 
bank branches is expected to be positively influenced by 
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deposits, roads and vehicles, permanent income and volume of 
loans outstanding. Inflation is expected to negatively affect 
bank branching. 
The model was fitted to pooled data of twenty districts for' 
1983 and 1984. Data on deposits, number of bank branches, and 
volume of rural loans outstanding were obtained from the Bangla-
desh Bank Data Tape. Data on literacy rates, inflation rates, 
income, and roads and vehicles were obtained from the Statistical 
Year Book, 1985, and District Statistics, 1983. 
Data on district agricultural GDP for the period 1976-84 
were taken as a proxy for district rural income, and were used to 
estimate permanent and transitory income in a trend equation. 
Trend values were considered as permanent income, while the 
residuals were treated as transitory income. Literacy was used 
as a proxy for awareness of banking, and was defined as the 
percentage of persons 5 years of age or above who can read and/or 
write. Since nominal interest rates offered by banks are the 
same across districts, differences in real interest rates were 
captured through district inflation rates measured by changes in 
the cost of living index. Data on rural inflation were available 
only for six regions representing the four administrative 
divisions. Because of the small geographical size of divisions, 
these inflation data were used to represent all twenty districts. 
The district roads and vehicles index was measured as: 
where, 
RDj I TAj 
POPj I TVj 
x 100 
Weighted index of roads and vehicles in jth 
dist~ict; 
Mileage of roads in jth district: 
= Total geographical area of jth district: 
Size of population in thousands of jth district. 
= Total number of vehicles in i.!.h district. 
Districts with a large number of vehicles and mileage of roads 
per 1,000 people will have a high index. Vehicles were defined 
to include buses, cars and rickshaws. 
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Analysis of Empirical Results 
The empirical results obtained in testing this model are 
presented in Tables 8 and 9. The second stage statistics report 
the direct effects of the explanatory variables on deposits 
(Table 8) and bank branches (Table 9). The reduced form 
coefficients show the total effects (direct and indirect) of the 
variables on deposits and bank branches. The coefficients in the 
double log equation can be interpreted as elasticities. 
All structural coefficients for the deposit equation had the 
expected signs and, except for inflation rate and permanent 
income, were statistically significant. The model explains about 
69 percent of the variance in interest bearing deposits. The 
bank branch equation explains about 80 percent of the variance. 
Except for roads and vehicles, all structural variables in the 
bank branch equation were statistically significant. Both 
equations were significant at the 0.0001 level. 
The significant cross coefficients for the bank branch and 
interest bearing deposits variables in the structural equations 
support the hypothesis of two-way casualty between deposits and 
bank branches. The elasticity of interest bearing deposits with 
respect to bank branches estimated at 0.985 was significant at 
the 0.05 level, while the elasticity of bank branches with 
respect to interest bearing deposits estimated at 0.158 was 
significant at the 0.10 level. 
Measures of both absolute and permanent income were tested. 
No statistically significant direct effect was found between 
deposits and permanent and absolute income, but both variables 
were significant in the reduced form deposit equation. 
Transitory income was significant in both deposit equations, and 
the magnitude of the coefficient was substantially larger than 
for the permanent income variable. These results imply that the 
permanent income hypothesis better explains the influence of 
income than does absolute income. 
Both permanent income and inflation were not significant in 
the structural equation for deposits. But both were significant 
in the bank branch equations implying they influence the decision 
to expand banking facilities. High inflation rates reduce the 
real value of nominal deposits and discourage branch expansion. 
Because of the inter-relationship between permanent income, 
inflation, bank branch and deposits, it can be inferred that 
permanent income and inflation influence deposits indirectly 
through bank branches. 
The roads and vehicles index had a direct effect on 
deposits, but not on expansion of bank branches. The reduced 
form coefficients for roads and vehicles were statistically 
significant in both the deposit and bank branch equations. This 
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implies that roads and vehicles influence bank branching 
indirectly through their effects on deposits. 
Income, roads and vehicles, inflation, and literacy were ali 
significant in the deposit equation. Zero-coefficients were 
assumed for the volume of outstanding rural loans in t~e deposit 
equation, and for the literacy and transitory income variables in 
the bank branch equation. The reduced form coefficients show the 
validity of these assumptions. The volume of rural loans 
outstanding had a positive effect on expansion of banking facili-
ties, although the coefficient was relatively small. The 
coefficients for the other two variables were signif~cant. 
The elasticity of deposits with respect to the explanatory 
variables in relation to their level of significance suggest that 
transaction costs, proxied by expansion of bank branches and 
roads and vehicles, have an important impact on the demand for 
deposits. Transaction costs and transitory income are the two 
major factors explaining interest-bearing deposits. Expansion of 
bank branches is largely explained, apart from deposits, by 
permanent income and inflation. 
Implications for Rural Deposit Mobilization 
Bangladesh has made important strides in rural deposit 
mobilization. The share of rural deposits to total deposits 
increased from 9.2 to 17 percent from 1976 to 1984. Interest-
bearing deposits represent about 80 percent of the total. About 
95 percent of the rural deposit accounts in 1983 and 1984 
representing one-half of total deposits were less than 5,000 taka 
($200) in size suggesting that large numbers of low and mediua 
income households are utilizing deposit services. Deposit growth 
in the rural hinterland was somewhat faster than in the more 
commercialized districts of the country in those two years. 
An important factor explaining rural deposit expansion has 
been the rapid growth in rural branches, especially during the 
period when the "two-for-one" branching policy was in effect. 
From 1976 to 1984, the number of rural branches increased four-
fold from 826 to 3301. Previous studies of deposit mobilization 
have stressed the positive impact of improved access to financia~ 
services which occurs when an expanded banking network reduces 
transaction costs for rural bank clients. Smaller size bank 
deposits become more attractive for households when the trans-
action costs of banking falls. This study, however, emphasizes 
the simultaneous relationship that exists between deposits and 
branches. An increase in branch density stimulates deposits 
while deposit potential is posited to affect the number and 
location of bank branches. 
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The econometric analysis of district deposits showed that 
the elasticity of interest bearing deposits with respect to bank 
branches was over 0.9 while the elasticity of bank branches with 
respect to deposits exceeded 0.15. Permanent and absolute levels 
of rural income were analyzed. The elasticity of deposits with 
respect to estimated transitory income approached 2.5 suggesting 
that deposits are used to even out the variability that occurs in 
ordinary income. Literacy and the roads and vehicles index also 
had a positive effect on deposits. 
Permanent income and inflation were significant in the bank 
branch equation indicating they influence rural deposits in-
directly through bank branches. The volume of rural loans 
outstanding also had a positive effect on branches although the 
coefficient was small. 
These Bangladesh results confirm several expectations about 
rural deposit mobilization and suggest implications for other 
countries. Households respond to the net returns earned on their 
financial investments. Real interest rates represent the change 
in purchasing power that households gain from their deposits. 
These rates have often been negative in Bangladesh except for 
longer term fixed deposits. Over time, the mix of deposits has 
shifted towards higher interest rate categories. 
Net returns to deposits are also influenced by the trans-
action costs borne by depositors. Apart from the internal 
operations of banks which determine how much time is spent and 
how •uch expense is encountered with opening an account and 
depositing and withdrawing funds, two external factors influence 
depositor transaction costs. The first is the density of the 
banking network. The rapid expansion of bank branches in 
Bangladesh has brought banking services geographically much 
closer to many rural households and has stimulated them to hold 
deposit accounts. With a given branch network, the second 
i•portant factor is ease of transportation, represented in this 
study by the index of roads and vehicles. 
The millions of small deposit accounts in rural bank 
branches in Bangladesh are evidence of the value that low income 
households place on deposit services. They show, furthermore, 
the ability that low income people have to save. This example, 
along with the recent deposit mobilization experiences in other 
low income countries, destroys the myth that the rural poor 
cannot save. 
This research does not establish, however, that rural 
banking in Bangladesh is cost-effective. Through its branching 
and rural lending policies, Bangladesh has succeeded in expanded 
rural branches and, through them, rural loans. Banks have used 
the branch network to mobilize deposits, and the ratio of rural 

















first time in 1983 and approached 1.4 in 1986. But loan recovery 
of rural loans is a serious problem and appears to have deteri-
orated. Therefore the viability of rural banking is in question. 
The fact that, upon privatization, two nationalized co•mercial 
banks dropped out of participation in government agricultural 
credit programs and transferred several rural branches to the 
remaining NCBs and BKB is indicative of the problem. 
Bangladesh policymakers have succeeded in accomplishing the 
easy aspect of deposit mobilization, namely expanding the branch 
network. The remaining challenge is to make the system finan-
cially viable. Greater attention is required to assessing the 
losses the banking system must absorb by operating s•all branches 
and by making many loans that are not repaid versus the gains to 
borrowers and depositors through lower transaction costs and 
greater access to financial services. 
Table 1 
Interest Rate Structure of Rural Bari< Deposits, 
1971 to present 
Dec 1971 July l, 1974 April l, 1976 May 1, 1977 Oct .16, 1980 Dec. 2, 1982 Jan. 1, 1985 
Type of Deposit to to to to to to to 
Jme 1974 M3rcll 31, 1976 April 30, 1977 Oct. 15' 1980 Dec l, 1982 Dec. 31, 1984 Present 
Call deposits none none none none 4 1/2 none none 
Special account 3 - 3 1/4 4 - 4 1/4 5 - 5 1/4 4 - 4 1/4 4 1/2 4 1/2 4 1/2 
Savi~ with 
6.oo!¥ 81/2~ cheddng 4.00 5.00 6.00 8 1/2 10 1/2 
Savi~ without 
cheddng 4 1/2 6.00 7.00 7 3/4 10.00 10.00 11.00 
~ 
Fixed deposits (tem): 00 
1) 3 IOOllths and over, 
less than 6 4 1/2 6.00 7.00 8 1/2 12.00 12.00 12.00 
2) 6 ioonths and over, 
less than 1 year 4 3/4 6 1/2 7 1/2 9.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 
3) 1 year and over, 
less than 2 5.00 7 1/4 8 1/4 9 1/4 14.00 14.00 14.00 
4) 2 years and over, 
less than 3 5 1/2 8 1/4 9 1/4 9 1/4 14 1/2 14 1/2 14 1/2 
5) For 3 years and 
over 6.00 9 1/4 10 1/4 10 1/4 15.00 15.00 15.00 
y Reduced to 4 1/2 percent in effect fran August l, 1977. 
QI In the rural areas, the rate was 9 1/2 percent in effect fron July l, 1984 
Source: Ecotun.ic Trerxis, December, 1985, Bangladesh Bank. 
Special 
Year CUrrent Gall account 
deposits deposits deposits 
1975 3,082 60 2,295 
1976 3,383 74 2,773 
1977 3,920 103 3,554 
1978 4,425 268 4,185 
1979 5,808 410 5,452 
1980 7,473 186 8,278 
1981 7,616 289 9,024 
1982 8,006 752 9,019 
1983 10,808 1,029 11,024 
1984 14,207 468 14,962 
Average 
GrG\ltll Rate 
(Percent) 18.9 47.4 23.9 
TABLE 2 
Total Bank Deposits 
By Type of Deposit, 1975-84 
Year Errling Juoo 30 
'IYPE 
--------------·-··>---,-~~--~-----------------------------
SAVI~ IEFU)ITS TE»t DER:SITS (months) 
Checking Non-checking 3-<6 &-<12 12--<24 24-<36 36+ 'IUI'AL 
1,964 331 532 439 544 100 834 10,182 
2,410 396 396 234 655 150 1,121 11,594 
2,882 486 520 272 781 232 1,701 14,453 
3,542 686 382 413 819 277 2,479 17,477 
4,461 1,078 315 701 955 367 3,384 22,932 
5,099 1,371 381 579 1,043 401 4,258 28,068 
6,796 2,093 897 927 1,486 551 5,577 35,236 
6,749 2,246 1,327 912 2,193 572 6,720 38,501 
8,475 2,805 2,339 1,468 3,893 700 8,557 50,980 
11,098 3,895 3,739 3,154 7,017 900 12,144 71,584 
21.6 32.4 33.6 34.2 35.4 28.7 35.0 24.5 






Total Bade Deposits 
8Y Rlll'al am Urban Branches. 1976-84 
Year Erd.i1'? Jme 30 
RlEAL URBAN 
Year Nultler of Total Average Percent Nultler of Total Average Percent 
Branches Deposits Deposits of Total Branches Deposits Deposits of 1btal 
per Branch Deposits per Branch Deposits 
(Million Taka) (Million Taka) 
1976 826 1,063 1.28 9.2 922 10,531 11.42 90.8 
1977 1,053 1,552 1.47 10.7 1,000 12,901 12.78 89.3 
1978 1,634 2,316 1.42 13.3 1,125 15,161 13.48 86.7 
1979 2,001 3,540 1.77 15.4 1,247 19,391 15.55 84.6 
1980 2,437 5,041 2.07 17.3 1,342 24,027 17.90 82.7 
"' 1981 2,796 5,599 2.00 16.2 1.493 29,587 19.82 83.8 0 
1982 2,932 5,938 2.03 15.4 1,538 32,563 21.17 84.6 
1983 3,050 8,544 2.80 16.8 1,565 42,437 27.12 83.2 
1984 3,301 12,215 3.70 17.1 1,684 59,369 35.25 82.9 
Average 
C3r<Mth Rate 19.8 36.7 15.1 7.9 24.4 15.4 
(Percent) 
Source: Bangladesh Banlc Bulletin, February, 1985. 
Scheduled Banlc Statistics, 1976-84, Bangladesh Bank. 




Rural Deposits of Five Banks 
by Type of Deposit, 1983-84 
Year Ending June 30 
1983 1984 
---·-·----~------ ·--·------<·--Deposit Percent Deposits Percent 
·--···---------·- ·------- (Million Taka) 
CUrrent Deposits 1,588 20.7 2,112 19.0 
Call Deposits 67 0.9 70 0.6 
Special Account 
Deposits 624 8.1 920 0.3 
Savings (Checking) 
Deposits 2,671 34.8 3,715 33.4 
Savings (Non-checking) 
Deposits 946 12.3 1,405 12.6 
Fixed Deposits (term) : 
3 - < 6 months 54 0.7 96 0.9 
6 - < 12 months 67 0.9 156 1.4 
12 - < 24 months 251 3.3 413 3.7 
24 - < 36 months 75 1.0 122 1.1 
36 + months 1,343 17.5 2,113 19.0 
TOTAL 7,686 100 11,122 100 
-·· -····---··~-h•••·--·~---·"' ~ ..... ---- ·---··. --··. ~ -- ..... ---··-------··-
_____ ,. __ . ____ 
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TABLE 5 
Rural Deposits of Five &inks 
lYf Category of Depositors, 1983-84 .. 
Year Ending June 30 
---------· -··--···-···-- ·····- ------··---·--··---------- ·-··-·····----· ----· ··--· .. 
1983 .1984 Growth 
·-····~······ ...... _ ......... -- .. -·--·- ··-··--
Category Deposits Percent Deposit Percent Rate 
Percent 












local authorities 417 
Others 119 
PRIVATE SECTOR· 6,354 


















































········· ---·······-·····--------------·------··-·-----·-- -·-····· -······ 
y Totals may not agree because of rou.'lding. 














Size Distribution of Rural Deposit ACCOWlts 
of Five Banks. 1983-84 
Year Erxling June 30 
---·----- ______ .. _ ,----·--.--·-· 
·----- . ------~-------- ··-------~------·---·----------- ------- - ···----.----- •-#-.---·------ ·--------
Gl"CMth Rate 
1983 1984 Percent 
------------
Size of Number of Nunber of Nunber of 
Account Deposits Percent Accounts Percent Deposits Percent Accounts Percent Deposits Accounts 
-----.--·-·· -- ---~ . -------------------------·-·----------·---------------·~-------------------------··-----------· - ----------~-------- ·------ - ---· -·····--(Thousand) (Million Taka) 
0 - < 5 ~7 50.8 3,812,936 95.3 5,375 48.3 4,687,213 94.0 37.6 22.9 
5 - < 10 720 9.4 102,556 2.6 1.093 9.8 156,811 3.2 51.8 52.9 
10 - < 25 926 12.0 61,042 1.5 1,333 13.8 101,148 2.0 65.6 65.7 N 
25 - < 50 545 7.1 16,042 0.4 875 7.9 25,877 0.5 60.6 61.3 lN 
50 - < 100 372 4.8 5,412 0.2 628 5.7 9,377 0.2 68.8 73.3 
100 - < 200 310 4.0 2,317 0.1 675 6.1 2,992 0.1 118.0 29.1 
200 - < 300 112 1.5 466 ~ 152 1.4 635 ¥ 36.5 36.3 
300 - < 400 69 0.9 204 ¥ 86 0.8 249 ~ 25.2 22.1 
400 - < 500 68 0.9 152 a/ 53 0.5 118 ¥ -21.4 -22.4 
500 - <1000 138 1.8 212 ~ 232 2.1 339 ¥ 69.2 59.9 
1000 + 521 6.8 202 ¥ 684 6.2 268 ¥ 31.3 32.7 
TOTAL 7686 4,001,504 ll, 122 4,985,027 44.7 24.6 
-----------
!!I Less than 0.1 percent. 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Dita Tape 
• 




Rural Deposits for Five Banks 
by District, 1983-84 
Year ending June 30 
1983 1984 
































































~/ Totals may not agr,'=e because of rounding. 


























Estimated Parareters of the Ik>uble Log 
Interest Bearing ~posit Function 
Fernenent Incane Hypothesis Absc;l_ute I'1<:::one Hypothesis 
Reduced Form Second Stage Reduced Forn Second Stage 
Parameter F.quation Statistics Indirect EQ11ation Statistics 
(Variable) T-Ratio) (T-RatioL_ Effect N {T-Ratio) __ ff :Bat!QL__ 
Intercept -1.686*** 6.06*** -2.243** 10.992** 
(-.932) (.884) (-1.328) (1.428) 
(PYP) .595* .057 .538 
(3.571) ( .0&1) 
(P'x'T) 2.783** 2.40** .383 
(1.225) (1.260) 
(L) .216 .185*** .031 .286*** .169 
( .595) ( .849) ( .811) (. 758) 
(P) -.104 .058 -.162 .009 .287* 
(-.560) (.230) ( .00') (1. 760) 
(BF) .985* 1.626** 
(1. 785) (1.586) 
(RIJV) .278* .219* .059 .263 .167* 
(4.138) (2.333) (3.948) (2.194) 
(PCR) .119 .194*** 
( .623) (1.134) 
(PV) .56.5* -.341 
(3.386) (-.590) 
F-Ratio 7 .1.!Y 11.91!V 8.1~ 16.~ 
R-Square .684 .706 
*Significant at .05 level. 
**Significant at .10 level. 
***Significant at .20 level. 
'!! Indirect effects are estimated as the difference be~n the reduced form and the 
second stage coefficients. 




• TAIU 9 
Estimated Paraneters of 1be lbuble Log 
Bank Branch Fmction 
Permanent IncaE H.VDothesis Absolute IllOCIE llYDothesis 
Reduced Form Se<Xni Stage Reduced Form Seccl1d stage 
Parameter F.quation statistics Indirect F.quatim statistics 
(variable) CT-Ratio) CT-Ratio) Effect!! (T-Ratio) (T-Ratio) 
Intercept -8.166* -7.893* -8.14* -7.577* 
(11.06) (-12.762) (-11.762) (-10.959) 




(Pl) .557* .415* 
(8.145) (1.864) 
(L) .038 .072 
( .254) ( .483) 
(P) -.17* -.155* -.015 -.171* -.173* 
(-2.254) (-3.591) (-2.936) (-4.208) 
(RDV) .063* .022 .041 .009* -.OCTT 
(2.309) ( .294) (2.178) (-.061) 
(Pm) * .126 .107** .019 .119* .071*** 
(1.617) (1.487) (1. 702) ( .864) 
(DINI' /PlJ>) .158** .252** 
(1.624) (1.679) 
F-Ratio 12.942/ 26.~ 14.7~ 29.ls!?i 
R-Square .'194 .811 
*Significant at .05 level. 
**Significant at .10 level. 
***Significant at .20 level. 
~ Indirect effects are estimated as the difference bebeen the reduced fom am the 
secxlJd stage coefficients. 
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